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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF

UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent

v.
SELMAR RAY PURCELL,

Case No. 16783

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, SELMAR RAY PURCELL, appeal from a jury
verdict of guilty of escape in the Third Judicial District
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah the Honorable Dean
E. Conder, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty of escape and sentenced
to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for the term provided
for by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and
judgment and an order directing the case to be remanded to the
Third Judicial District Court with directions to have a new
trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 24, 1979 the appellant and two other inmates
walked away from the Utah State Prison (T.95, 114-117) all three
inmates were apprehended within hours in the Granger area of
Salt Lake County (T.123).

About a month prior to this incident

the appellate had been attacked by several other prisoners
and had received a number of stab wounds in his back and
chest area and his legs (T.193, 208-209, 222, 248-9).

Although

the appellant did not officially report the incident for fear of
reprisals by the inmates he did report it to M..r. Chavez, one
of the counselors at the Utah State Prison.

(T .124-5)

In addition

the appellant asked to be removed from the section of the
where the attack took place (T.233).

prison

At the time of the trial

the appellant and other witnesses testified that he was continuously:
afraid for his life after the stabbing incident (T. 184, 226-7).
The appellant further testified that having failed to be
transferred on request and being afraid that if he officially
reported the attack he would suffer reprisals, it was his
intention to attempt an escape so that he would be transferred to
the maximum security block which is the usual penalty for
attempted escape (T.227-8, 241).

The appellant testified that

it was his intention from the beginning that after making good
his escape he would then turn himself in to the authorities
(T.264).

During the course of the trial the appellant requested

a continuance to compel the attendance of Mr. Chavez who had been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

subpoenaed but failed to appear

only defense witness that was an official at the Utah State
Prison with direct knowledge of the stabbing of the defendant
(T.224-5).

The trial judge ruled that such testimony would

only be cumulative and refused to grant the continuance
(T.275).

At the close of the trial the judge refused all of

the appellant's requested jury instructions on compulsion
and verbally instructed the jury from the bench as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, I propose to
submit this to you_for your determination. Before
I do, however, I'm going to strike the testimony
that has been received here in Court about any
threats or coercion upon the defendants causing
them if they did decide to leave the prison,
that testimony I don't think is applicable to the
case. And you are admonished to disregard it . . .
(T. 268)
The appellate took proper exception to the refused
instruction (T. 274).
During the second day of trial at the end of the afternoon recess the court on its own motion cleared the courtroom
of all spectators, locked the courtroom doors and placed two
extra sheriff's deputies inside the courtroom (T.244-245). A
motion for a mistrial was made and joined in by all the parties
on the grounds that the closing of the courtroom denied the
appellant the right to a public trial as guaranteed by the constitution of the United States and the State of Utah. (T.257).

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY ON COMPULSION AS REQUESTED BY THE APPELLATE
AND COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF A WITNESS FOR
CORROBORATION.
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended) provides:
Compulsion - (1) A person is not guilty of an offense
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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when he engaged in the proscribed conduct because
he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened
imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him
or a third person, which force or threatened force
a person of reasonable firmness in his situtaion
would not have resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this
section shall be unavailable to a person who
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places
himself in a situation in which it is probable that
he will be subjected to duress.
At the trial the appellant testified that he was compelled
to leave the prison because he was in fear for his life.
This contention would have been corroborated by Mr. Chavez,
an employee at the Utah State Prison, but Mr. Chavez failed
to appear when subpoened and the trial court refused to allow
time to compel his attendance.

The trial court's exclusion

of the only non-prisoner witness for the defense Mr. Chavez
seriously compromised the corroboration of the defendant's
case.

The right to present all competent evidence in his

behalf is inherent in the Due Process guarantees of a fair
trial.

In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 92 L.Ed 2d 682, 68 S.Ct.

499 (1948) .
In the case of United States v. Bailey,
62 L.Ed. 575, 100 S.Ct.

U.S.

(Jan 21, 1980) the United States

has considered the defense of compulsion in escape cases.

In the

Baily case the Supreme Court recognized the defense of compulsion provided it is demonstrated that the only reasonab}e
alternative was to escape and that a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody is made.

Even though the Supreme

Court recognized the defense of compulsion in an escape case the
Instruction on compulsion was not appropriate because the
defendant was out of custody a month or more and there was no
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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evidence of any intent to return.

In the present case the

defendant was recaptured within a short period following his
escape and he testified in court that he intended to turn
himself back into the prison authorities in order to receive
a different custodial treatment at the

prison.

In the case of United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d
543 (10th Circuit-1978) the defendant was tried and convicted
in the federal court for attempted escape.

The defendant

admitted his attempted escape but contended that he was
coerced into leaving the prison from a long history of abuse
and mistreatment at the hands of both the prison officials and
fellow inmates.

The 10th Circuit affirmed the conviction holding

that the trial court properly instructed the jury and that the
defense of coercion did not excuse escape unless there was no
time for a complaint to be made or unless such a complaint would
have been futile.

The court also held that the prisoner must

have intended to report innnediately to the proper authorities
upon obtaining a position of safety.

New Mexico in a recent

Supreme Court decision recognized the defense of compulsion
in a fact situation very similar to those presented in the
instant case.

Esquibel v. State, 576 P.2d 1129 (N.M. 1978).

New Mexico Supreme Court, noting that duress or compulsion is
historically a widely recognized defense to escape stated:
Defendant successfully raises the defense of duress
when he presents evidence . . . from which a jury
can conclude that he feared inunediate great bodily
harm to himself or another person if he did not
commit the crime charged and that a reasonable
person would have acted in the same way under the
circumstances. The defendant thus having
established a prima facia case of duress (compulsion),
the burden then shifts to the State to prove beyond

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

The

a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act
under such reasonable fear, 576 P.2d at 1132.

The E"squihel court held that in view of a prolonged history
of beatings and serious threatsl the most recent having occured
48 to 72 hours before the escape, the defendant was entitled
to an instruction on

duress~

The compulsion in the instant

case was at least as serious as in the Esquibel case since
Purcell had received a number of stab wounds .
In the case of State v. Horn, 566 P.2d 1378
(Hawaii 1977); the Hawaii Supreme Court reversed a lower court
conviction for not instructing the jury on the question of
compulsion.

The defense offered evidence of a history of

violence among the prisoners and a refusal or inability of
prison officials to guarantee security and safety in a particular
cell block.

The Supreme Court in the Horn case held that if

competent evidence going to the defense of compulsion was
presented then the jury should have been instructed on that
question.
In a Florida case the Supreme Court reversed a lower
court for its failure to permit the defendant to establish a
defense where he contended that he escaped to avoid sexual
advances and threats of sexual battery.
S. 2d 529 (Florida 1975).

Lewis v. State, 318

The Supreme Court in the Lewis case

stated that if the defendants proffered evidence were true he
would have a valid defense insofar as it might establish a
lack of willful intent to avoid lawful confinement or at least
create a reasonable doubt.

The defendant claimed he escaped for

the purpose of reporting the threats to the circuit judge.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Lewis case is directly in point with the instant case in
that Purcell testified that he escaped for the purpose of
turning himself in so that he would be placed in maximum
security custody.
The Michigan Supreme Court in the case of People v.
Luther, 232 N.W, 2d 184 held that duress is a well recognized
defense and co.uld excuse a defendant from criminal responsibility
in an escape case.

In the buthe-r case the Supreme Court held

that duress is a jury question that is successfully raised
when evidence is presented from which a jury could conclude;
(a) The threatening conduct was sufficient to
create in the mind of a reasonable person the fear
of death or serious bodily harm;
(b) The conduct in fact caused such fear of death
or serious bodily harm in the mind of the defendant;
(c) The fear or duress was operating upon the mind
of the defendant at the time o.f the alleged act; and
(d) The defendant committed the act to avoid the
threatened harm.
The defendant in the Luther case testified that he had been
confronted earlier in the day by six assailants who made
homosexual demands on him, knocked him down and made threats
with a knife.
A defendant in a Kentucky case failed to specify
the names of his attackers when he escaped claiming he was
unable to pay a gambling debt,
S,W. 2d 488 (Kentucky 1974).

Pittman v . Commonwealth, 512
The defendantts testimony

was that four prisoners confronted him and demanded the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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money or homosexual acts.

The court merely instructed the

jury that if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that Pittman
escaped they should find him guilty.

The Kentucky Supreme

Court applied a standard of compulsion as:
"The present imminent and impending danger of such
a nature as to induce a well grounded apprehension
of death or serious bodily harm if the escape is not
made."
The court in Pittman held that the jury instruction was
prejudicial because relevant evidence proffered by the
defendant was excluded from the jury's consideration.
If the defense of compulsion is raised it is then
the State's responsibility to convince the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt that the escape was not the product of
duress.

People v. Field, 184 N.W.2d 551 (Michigan 1970).
It is the appellant's contention that he sufficiently

raised the issue of compulsion that the jury should have
been instructed on that issue.
jury

ins~ruction

The effect of not giving the

was tantamount to a directed verdict since

there was no denying the fact that appellant left the prison.
POINT---II

CLOSING THE APPELLANT'S TRIAL BASED ON UNSUBSTANTIATED
INFORMATION DENIED APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL.
The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial has been
guaranteed to State criminal defendant through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 264
(1947).

The relevant portion of the Sixth Amendment to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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United States Constitution provides, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial . . . . "

Almost the same language

is found in Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah and in Utah Code Ann" §77-1-8 (1953 as amended).
To determine if the acts of the trial court denied
the appellant his right to a public trial the history and
purpose of that protection should be considered.

The history

was succinctly described in the case of In re Oliver, supra.
This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing
a public trial to an accused has its roots in our
English connnon law heritage. The exact date of its
origin is obscure, but it likely evolved before
settlement of our land as an accompaniment of the
ancient institution of jury trial. In this country
the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public
trial first appeared in a state constitution in
1776. Following the ratification in 1791 of the
Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment, which
commands that "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial . . . " most of the original states and
those subsequently admitted to the Union adopted
similar constitutional provisions. Today almost
without exception every state by constitution,
statute, or judicial decision, requires that all
criminal trials be open to the public.
The traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret
trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious
use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition,
to the excesses of the English Court of Start Chamber,
and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de
cachet. All of these institutions obviously
symbolized a menace to liberty. In the hands of
despotic groups each of them had become an
instrument for the suppression of political and
religious heresies in ruthless disregard of the
right of an accused to a fair trial. Whatever
other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his
trial be conducted in public may confer upon our
society the guarantee has always been recognized

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as a safeguard against any attempt to employ
our courts as instruments of prosecution.
The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject
to contemporaneous review in the forum of public
opinion is an effective restraint on possible
abuse of judicial power. [footnotes omitted]
333 U.S. 264, 266-270
The purposes o·f the right to a public trial were
·described in the various opinions in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.

532 (1965).

In that case the court held that the public

trial guarantee could not be claimed by the media as a
justification for televising and broadcasting a criminal
trial.

Mr. Justice Clark, the author of the plurality

opinion, stated that:
. . . it is a "public trial" that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees to the "accused". The
purpose of the requirement of a public trial
was to guarantee that the accused would
be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condenmed.
History has proven that secret tribunals were
effective instruments of oppression. 381 U~S.
532, 538-539.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren in a concurring opinion quoted
In re Oliver, supra, then enumerated some other purposes of
the right to a public trial:
. . . the public trial provision of the Sixth
Amendment is a "guarantee to an accused" designed
to "safeguard against any attempt to employ our
courts as instruments of persecution." Clearly,
the openness of the proceedings provides other
benefits as well: it arguably improves the
quality of testimony, it may induce unknown
witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony
it may move all trial participants to perform
their duties conscientiously, and it gives the
public the opportunity to observe the courts in
the performance of their duties and to determine
whether they are performing adequately.
[footnote omitted] 381 U.S. 532,582
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Similarly, Mr . Justice Harlan relied on In re Oliver, supra,
and stated in his concurring opinion,
The ''public trial u guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment which reflects a concept fundamental
to the administration of justice in this
country, [citation omitted] certainly does not
require that television be admitted to the
courtroom~
[citation omitted] Essentially,
the public trial guarantee embodies a view
of human nature, true as a general rule, that
Judges, lawyers, witnesses, and jurors will perform
their respective functions more responsibly in an
open court than in secret proceedings. [citation
omitted] A fair trial is the objective and a
"public trial" is an institutional safeguard for
attaining it,
381 U.S. 532,588
Due to the important nature of the purposes of a
public trial and the interests which it protects,
the subject of very few limitations.

it is

In cases decided by

this court the limitations can be placed in two categories:
the prevention of interference with orderly court procedures
and the need to shelter certain members of the public from
shocking or immoral facts.

In s·tate v. Jordan, 5 7 Ut. 612,

196 P.565 (1921) this court described such circumstances,
Aside from the inherent power of every court,
in rare instances, to exclude part of the public,
as in such extreme areas where its presence waild
interfere with the due and orderly procedure in the
progress of the trial, or where the testimony
is of such a character as to shock the sense of
decency or tend to degrade the public morals,
more especially those of the young, the
exclusion of the public should be, and generally is,
held to violative of the constitutional rights
of the accused. 196 P.565, 567.

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In that case this court reversed the appellant's conviction
for carnal knowledge, because the courtroom had been closed
when the prosecutrix testified.

In the case at bar the only

question is with respect to the interference with trial
procedure.
The cases from this court have not reached the
question of the procedures that a trial court should employ
to determine if it would be proper to close a courtroom.
Recently, the Court of Appeals of New York dealt with this
issue in People v . J'ones. 47 N.Y.2d 409, 391 N.E. 2d 1335
(N.Y. App., 1979).

In that case the prosecutor moved to close

the courtroom when an undercover agent began to testify.
The prosecutor represented to the court that the witness was
in fear for his life.

The judge closed the courtroom without

receiving any further information by way of testimony or
colloquy.

In doing so, the court stated that it would take

notice of the nature and dangers of being an undercover agent
in New York City.

During the course of cross examination of

the agent it was discovered that the agent was no longer working
undercover and was, in fact, working as a uniformed patrolman.
The court stated that when a trial judge is faced with a situation
where a request that the courtroom be closed is made and the
defendant has objected, the trial court should use its discretion
in determining if such a request is meritorious.

It was

suggested that in some cases it may be enough merely to question
counsel~

witnesses, or the spectators to reach a decision.

The court went on to state:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In other cases, the only truthworthy means of
establishing grounds for excluding the public may
very well be to hold an evidentiary hearing.
[citation omitted] which, if the need is apparent,
might be held behind closed doors [citation omitted].
In short, while there is no single rule to cover
every case, no closing can be tolerated that is not
preceded by an inquiry careful enough to assure
the court that the defendant's right to a public
trial is not being sacrificed for less than
compelling reasons. 391 N.E. 2d 1335, 1339.
Because of the lack of such an interest in that case the court
affirmed the order of the appellate division reversing the
conviction.
In the case at bar, the courtroom was ordered to be
closed and spectators were required to leave without any notice
to the appellant or his counsel (T.244-245).

No hearing was

held nor were facts given for the record to support the court's
action until the next recess when the jury was excused (T.258).
At that time it was revealed by one of the guards present in
the courtroom that he had received information via telephone
from the Murray City Police, who had received information
from a prison employee that there would be an escape attempt
from the trial (T.259),

Nothing was presented to establish

the reliability of the information from the prison employee.
There also is no indication in the record that any of the
defendants had done anything during the course of the proceeding
to indicate that there may be an escape attempt, nor was there

any disturbance by the defendants during the proceedings.
If an evidentiary hearing had been held there would be no
exception to Rule 63 as required by Rule 66 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence to allow such hearsay within hearsay evidence
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to be admitted.

Likewise, the mere assertion that one has

received a telephone call from a certain party lacks foundational
requirements for admissibility, see generally, - State

v. Merlar,

94 Idaho 803, 498 P,2d 1276 (1972).
Even if these proof problems could be overcome, the
court could have used alternatives to prevent an escape or any
other such courtroom disturbance other than closing the
courtroom to spectators.

For example, a guard could have

been placed by the doors to prevent escape. or the doors could
have been locked once the spectators were in the courtroom.
If there was a reason to believe that some of the spectators
would aid in such an escape attempt they could have been searched
prior to entering the courtroom,

In the alternative, any

combination of these alternatives may have been used.
Because there was no compelling reason given for
the closing of the courtroom in this case, nor was sufficient
inquiry made to satisfactorily establish such a compelling
reason, nor were other viable alternatives explored, the
appellant was denied the constitutional right to a public trial
as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 12 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.
POINT III
THE SHOWING OF THE DENIAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL REQUIRES THE REVERSAL
OF THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WITHOUT A SHOWING
OF PREJUDICE.
Since the appellant's right to a public trial has been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

denied, his conviction must be r

iled

that when a defendant ts right to a public trial has been
denied, prejudice need not be shown on appeal for the conviction
to be reversed, State v . Jordan, supra, State v. Bonza, 72 Utah
177, 269 P. 480 (1928).

In those cases, the Court did not

elaborate on the reasons for this ruling, however, reasons
given iri the case law support the necessity for such a rule.
In P'eople v. Jelke, 308 N.. Y. 56, 123 N. E. 2d 769

(N.Y. App. 1954), the Court of Appeals of New York reversed
a conviction for compulsory prostitution when the trial court
closed the courtroom to all spectators but friends and relatives
of the accused.

The court held that since the defendant's

right to a public trial had been denied he was entitled to
have his conviction reversed without a showing of prejudice.
The reason that the court gave was,
To plaint that such a ruling will result
in reversal of a conviction of one clearly
proved guilty, it is sufficient to say that the
decision herein far transcends the issue of
[defendant's] guilt or the disposition of this
particular case. As one court has expressed
it (Peo~le v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276, 286, 50 N.W.
995, 99 ), "It is for the protection of all
persons accused of crime - the innocently
accused, that they may not become the victim
of an unjust prosecution, as well as the guilty,
that they may be awarded a fair trial." 123 N.E. 2d
769, 775.
In People v. Jones, supra, this rule was upheld and
the court gave some other reasons for not requiring an appellant
to show prejudice when his right to a public trial has been
denied.

The reasons that the court gave are based on those

very same reasons given for the public trial protection,
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See generally, Point I, supra,

It is a significant safeguard

against unfair trials, likewise, it enhances the public's
confidence in the judicial system.

The court then

stated,
The harmless error rule is no way to guage the
great, though intangible, societal loss that
flows from the frustration of such a goal.
The practical impossibility of demonstrating
prejudice faces an accused as well. Conceptionally,
a member of a public witnessing a trial may
discover that he possesses material information
which he will then volunteer to the parties. Or,
the presence of the public may have a salutary
influence in deterring a witness from perjuring
himself in ways that would have been difficult
for the defense to counteract. To require the
defendant to undertake the well-nigh impossible
task of proving prejudice would render the right
to a public trial illusory and beyond appellate
review on that basis. 391 N.E. 2d 1335, 1340-1341.
For these reasons prejudice is implied when such a fundamental
right has been violated.

Consequently, due to the nature of

the right to a public trial, and because the trial court's
actions denied the appellant of his right to a public trial
in this case his conviction must be reversed even though
prejudice has not been shown,
CONCLUSIONS
The appellant is entitled to a new trial because the
court failed to allow the defense of compulsion to be
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considered by the jury and the court was closed to spectators
contrary to the appellant's constitutional right to a public
trial.
DATED this _ _ day of January

1

1981._

LYNN R. BROWN
Attorney for Appellant
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